

The first step along the path by which the text reached its current condition may well have been the misinterpretation of ἡ as ῆ. This would lead to οὐσία, and by conflation of variants to οὐσία οὐσίας. Finally, ἐπιστήμη preceded by οὐσίας and followed by μετέχει all too readily became ἐπιστήμης.⁹

The emendation proposed here is in the spirit of those proposed long ago by Apelt¹⁰ and by Garrod¹¹—both of whom grasped the essential point that Socrates' question at 585c7–8 was 'does anything have a greater share of x than knowledge does?' However, the 'x' in question, for them, is οὐσία simply, rather than ἡ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου οὐσία. This makes for a less satisfactory connection of thought with the preceding context. Another ancestor who should be mentioned is Bury¹² (followed by Vretska¹³), who proposes ἡ οὖν ἀεὶ ὁμοίου σιτία μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπιστήμη μετέχει;. My own proposal makes similar sense of the argument, but is a more straightforward emendation.¹⁴

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⁹ I owe the reasoning in this paragraph to Donald Mastronarde—whom I also thank for his helpful criticism of an earlier draft of this piece.

¹⁰ Otto Apelt, review of J. Adam, *The Republic of Plato*, *Wochenschrift für klassische Philologie* 13 (1903), 338–50, at 348–50.

¹¹ H.W. Garrod, 'Two passages of the *Republic*', *CR* 20 (1906), 209–12, at 210–12.

¹² R. G. Bury, 'On Plato, *Republic* IX. 585c–d', *CR* 13 (1899), 289–90.

¹³ Karl Vretska, 'Platonica III', *WS* 71 (1958), 30–54, at 52–4.

¹⁴ Both Bury and Vretska claim that the use of ὅλως at 585d1 indicates that some particular bodily food has been previously mentioned. But a sufficient contrast between particular and general is also set up, on my proposal, by the question 'and if anything [i.e. if any particular thing] has a smaller share in truth, doesn't it also have a smaller share in being?' Adam (n. 1) compares his own proposal to Bury's, since it too makes ἐπιστήμη (to be exact, ἡ ἐπιστήμης <οὐσία>) the subject of μετέχει. The shortcomings of Adam's proposal in other respects are well brought out by Apelt (n. 10). In revising this article I have benefited from the criticism of an anonymous reader for *CQ* and from objections to my emendation contained in an as yet unpublished piece by Paul-Jon Benson and Jay Elliott.

NEW LIGHT ON AN OLD CRUX: PLATO, *PHILEBUS* 66a8*

Πάντη δὴ φήσεις, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ὑπὸ τε ἀγγέλων πέμπων καὶ παροῦσι φράζων,
ὡς ἡδονὴ κτήμα οὐκ ἔστι πρῶτον οὐδ' αὖ δεύτερον, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν πῇ περὶ
μέτρον καὶ τὸ μέτριον καὶ καίριον καὶ πάντα ὅποσα χρή τοιαῦτα νομίζειν, τὴν †
αἰδιδίον ἡρῆσθαι. (Phil. 66 a4–8)

a8 τὴν αἰδιδίον BTW, Eusebius, *P.E.* 14.21.6, Stobaeus, *Ecl.* 3.6.68, Damascius p.121 W. (ut vid.):
τινὰ ἡδιδίον γρ. W in marg. ἡρῆσθαι (ηρ– B) BW, Stobaei LM^d: εἰρῆσθαι φάσιν (hoc acc.) T,
Eusebii ON (φασίν): εἰρῆσθαι φύσιν Parisinus 1812 (e corr.).

This is the manuscript evidence. I have checked Diès's report of T and W by means of photographs in my possession; for B I have used the facsimile published by Allen.¹

* It is a pleasure to record here my indebtedness to Professor James Diggle (Queens' College, Cambridge) and to Professor Jean Irigoin (Collège de France, Paris), who both kindly commented on a first draft of this note, which I dedicate to the memory of Jules Labarbe.

¹ *Plato, Codex Oxoniensis Clarkianus 39 phototypice editus*, praefatus est Th. G. Allen (Leiden, 1898–9).

The facts are as Diès reports them, save that in the margin of W the word *τινα* has been written *above* ἡδίων, apparently by a second hand; these words are preceded by the well-known formula γρ.καί.

Scholars have always puzzled about the last words of the sentence in question. Burnet and Diès rightly rejected φύσιν (the text of the so-called *vulgata*, followed by almost all the editors before them), since this word is not part of the ancient tradition of the text: it appears in *Paris. gr.* 1812 (fourteenth century), which is, as we now know (at least in the third tetralogy, to which the *Philebus* belongs) an indirect copy² of T. So φύσιν is likely to be nothing more than a Byzantine conjecture, hazarded perhaps by a reader who wished to make something out of φάσιν (the latter a *lectio singularis*, perhaps the remnant of a marginal gloss <φησίν?). At any rate φάσιν could not be an uncial error for φύσιν. On the other hand, τὴν αἰδίων (without φύσιν) does not make any sense. Hackforth translated hesitantly: 'for everlasting *tenure*' (τὴν αἰδίων, sc. αἰρεσιν), which is not very convincing.³ Moreover, ἡρῆσθαι περί (awkward Greek, in my view, despite Diès: as a matter of fact, Plato *never* uses περί c.acc. as a substitute for the accusative object required by αἰρεῖσθαι⁴) is not what one expects here: the question is clearly that of the *location* of the first human good. Badham, who saw the point, conjectured ἡύρῆσθαι, but the best emendation has been proposed by Hermann, who wished to read ἰδρῦσθαι. I agree with him on that, and his correction is strongly confirmed by the interpretation I shall propose for the rest of the disputed words.

Nevertheless τὴν αἰδίων remained unintelligible, and many conjectures have been proposed to emend the words in question: αἰτίαν Taylor, μίαν (vel πρώτην) ἰδέαν (i.e. α ἰδέαν) Burnet, κτήμα ἡδίων (vel τᾶμεινον) Bury, ἀηδίαν (!) Tovar; Diès adopted the reading of W^{mg}, τινὰ ἡδίων (ἡρῆσθαι), which is very dubious also. None of these suggestions fits in well with the context, and none of them is really satisfactory from the palaeographic point of view. One should interpret the facts in a purely palaeographic way: *THNAIDION* arose from an uncial error *N* → *AI* (with dittography), so that the original text must have been τὴν ἰδίων (sc. ἔδρα). Confusions between *N* and *AI* are indeed quite common in uncials; see for instance Hippocrates, *Ancient Medicine* 24.2 (1.636.4 Littré = 153.18 Jouanna) ἔστιν αἰεὶ Kühlewein *recte*: ἔστιν εἰ A: ἔστιν M; Plato, *Hippias Major* 294b1 ἔστιν TF: ἔσται WP. It is not necessary to assume an intermediate stage *THNAIIDION*; the corruption could easily have happened at one time, and the existence of the word αἰδῖος made it even easier. It is also worth noticing that Plato uses ἰδῖος as the feminine form at *Protagoras* 349b4. And just as each part of virtue may have *its own essence*, peculiar to itself (ἰδῖος οὐσία, *Protag.* *ibid.*), so each human good has *its own abode* (ἰδῖος ἔδρα); it is but natural that the first good should be 'set up in its proper place somewhere in the region of measure', since measure is the most important component in every mixture (and therefore also in the mixed life), as was pointed out by Socrates at 64d.

² See C. Moreschini, 'Studi sulla tradizione manoscritta del Parmenide e del Fedro di Platone', *Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa* II 34 (1965), 179–84; C. Brockmann, *Die handschriftliche Überlieferung von Platons Symposion* (Wiesbaden, 1992), 178–84; E. Berti, 'Osservazioni filologiche alla versione del Filebo di Marsilio Ficino', *Il Filebo di Platone e la sua fortuna*, a cura di P. Cosenza (Napoli, 1996), 161, n. 153.

³ R. Hackforth, *Plato's Examination of Pleasure. A Translation of the Philebus, with Introduction and Commentary* (Cambridge, 1945), 138. See A. Diès in his Budé edition of the *Philebus* (Paris, 1949), XC; J. C. B. Gosling, *Plato: Philebus* (Oxford, 1975), 137; D. Frede, *Platon, Philebos. Übersetzung und Kommentar* (Göttingen, 1997), 85. Yet I think Hackforth is right in translating *πῇ περὶ* 'somewhere in the region of' (*ibid.*). See below.

⁴ Cf. L. Brandwood, *A Word Index to Plato* (Leeds, 1976), 20.

If we now turn to grammar, we see that the words τὴν ἴδιον (sc. ἔδραν) ἰδρῦσθαι constitute a fairly colloquial expression: in a cognate accusative—ἔδρα and ἰδρύειν have the same root—with both the article and an adjective (or another determinative), the noun itself is not infrequently omitted, cf. Herodotus 1.109.1 τὸ παιδίον κεκοσμημένον τὴν ἐπὶ θανάτῳ (sc. κόσμῳ), 3.119.2 ἔδρασε τὴν ἐπὶ θανάτῳ (sc. δέσῳ), 7.84 Πέρσαι μὲν τὴν αὐτὴν (sc. σκευὴν) ἔσκευασμένοι καὶ ὁ πεζὸς αὐτῶν; Plato, *Sympos.* 173a τὰ ἐπινίκια (sc. θύματα) ἔθνευ; with a semantically equivalent verb Plato, *Laches* 184d τὴν ἐναντίαν γάρ, ὡς ὄρας, Λάχης Νικία ἔθετο (sc. ψήφον, cf. *Protag.* 330c); without the article Xenophon, *An.* 5.8.12 τοῦτον μὲν ἀνέκραγον πάντες ὡς ὀλίγας (sc. πληγὰς) παίσειεν. The same kind of accusative is also found with intransitive verbs: see, for instance, Thucydides 1.37.3 ἡ πόλις αὐτῶν ἅμα αὐτάρκη θέσιν κειμένη; Euripides, *Bacch.* 925–6 οὐχὶ τὴν Ἴνους στάσιν / ἢ τὴν Ἀγανῆς ἐστάναι;⁵ Again, according to the suggested interpretation, πρῶτον is to be regarded as the subject of ἰδρῦσθαι; this sense (πρῶτον = πρῶτον κτῆμα, so also Bury,⁶ Hackforth, Frede, and others) does not require the definite article, as appears from 27c9–10: πρῶτον πέρι καὶ δευτέρου, which means ‘about the first place and the second’.

Lastly, ἰδρῦσθαι is quite appropriate here: it echoes unequivocally the ‘residence of the Good’, which has been mentioned a little earlier in the Dialogue (ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ νῦν ἤδη προθύροις καὶ τῆς οἰκίσεως ἐφεστάναι τῆς τοῦ τοιούτου, 64c; cf. 61a9, 63b3, c2, d3). One can compare the use of the word in Plato *Sympos.* 195e5 (sc. Ἐρως) . . . τὴν οἴκησιν ἰδρυται (‘his home is set up . . .’).⁷

We can thus read τὴν ἴδιον ἰδρῦσθαι, and render the passage in question as follows: φήσεις (. . .) πρῶτον (sc. κτῆμα) μὲν πη περὶ μέτρον (. . .) τὴν ἴδιον (sc. ἔδραν) ἰδρῦσθαι, ‘you shall declare . . . that the first (possession) is settled in its proper place somewhere in the region of measure’. The variation in the construction of φάναι (here first with ὡς, then with infinitive) is not isolated; the closest parallel seems to be Demosthenes 4.48 ἡμῶν δ’ οἱ μὲν περιϊόντες μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίων φασὶ Φίλιππον πράττειν τὴν Θηβαίων κατάλυσιν καὶ τὰς πολιτείας διασπᾶν, οἱ δ’ ὡς πρέσβεις πέπομφεν ὡς βασιλέα, οἱ δ’ ἐν Ἰλλυριοῖς πόλεις τειχίζειν.⁸ I suspect that this (decidedly disconcerting⁹) use of ὡς with φάναι may have been caused by the proximity of φράζων.

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⁵ On the ellipsis see R. Kühner and B. Gerth, *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache II: Satzlehre* 2 (Hannover and Leipzig, 1904), 558–9, §596a4; E. Schwyzler and A. Debrunner, *Griechische Grammatik II: Syntax und syntaktische Stilistik* (München, 1950), 175.2; 708 β; on the cognate accusative, *ibid.* 74–7; for ἔδρα as an accusative of the same kind, cf. Aeschyl. *Prom.* 389; Sophocles *OT* 2 (LSJ s.v. θακέω).

⁶ R. G. Bury, *The Philebus of Plato*, edited with *Introduction, Notes and Appendices* (Cambridge, 1897), 171. However, LSJ (s.v. πρότερος, B.III.3a) take πρῶτον adverbially at 66a6.

⁷ As the referee has pointed out to me, a metaphor with ἔδρα occurs in the *Philebus* itself, at 24d1 (αὐτὸ [sc. τὸ ποσόν] τε καὶ τὸ μέτριον ἐν τῇ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ἥρέμα ἔδρα ἐγγενέσθαι).

⁸ See Kühner and Gerth (n. 5), 357, §550.3a; Schwyzler and Debrunner (n. 5), 646.

⁹ Cf. E. R. Dodds, *Plato: Gorgias. A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary* (Oxford, 1959), 283, on 487d5.